How China’s Internet Wars Forged Today’s Tech Giants

In 1969 the U.S. Department of Defense first used the internet for military connections, linking four computers at four southwestern universities.

Who could have imagined the profound impact this would have on humanity?

In 1993 the internet truly emerged when the White House announced the start of "online services".

Soon after, the term "Internet" became popular worldwide.

The first generation of internet giants, led by Yahoo, once reached a market value of $200 billion.

In March 2000 the NASDAQ, dominated by tech stocks, rose to 5,000 points, marking the peak of the dot‑com bubble.

The bubble burst quickly, and many internet companies collapsed, while survivors became the second‑generation giants.

Turning to China, in 1998 Zhou Hongyi, then a department manager at Founder, founded 3721 and later sold it to Yahoo for $120 million.

In 2001 NetEase’s stock fell to a few cents; founder Ding Lei struggled to find investors, but the company later surged hundreds of times.

In 2002 Tencent’s servers were overloaded by massive user influx; Ma Huateng struggled to sell QQ, eventually receiving investment from Yingke Telecom after being rejected by Lei Jun and Zhang Chaoyang.

In 2007 Steve Jobs unveiled a small device that would change the world.

The internet, once applied to commerce, perfectly followed the "dark forest" law: every entrepreneur is a hunter in a dark forest, constantly vigilant of rivals.

Competition in the internet is driven by suspicion; if you don’t know what an opponent will do, you act first.

High‑frequency, essential services win over low‑frequency, non‑essential ones.

The past ten years were the most intense period of internet competition.

In 2010 Zhou Hongyi, feeling pressure from Tencent, launched 360’s "QQ Guard" and the 3Q war officially began.

The 3Q war is considered the first internet world war in China.

It consisted of four stages:

Stage 1: Tencent aggressively promoted QQ Doctor, directly competing with 360’s security product.

Stage 2: 360 responded with "QQ Guard", accusing Tencent of privacy monitoring.

Stage 3: Tencent forced users to choose between uninstalling 360 or QQ.

Stage 4: The Ministry of Industry and Information Technology intervened, leading to a reconciliation between Tencent and 360.

Both sides exchanged public statements, with Ma Huateng and Zhou Hongyi emphasizing user support.

The result: 360 lost over 30% of its users within days, while Tencent’s loss was negligible.

Tencent’s high‑frequency instant‑messaging product easily defeated 360’s lower‑frequency security product.

Nevertheless, 360 gained public sympathy, went public shortly after, and avoided being crushed.

Tencent, after reflecting on the war, became more open and embarked on a second wave of growth.

Meanwhile, a company called Meituan was founded during the 3Q war.

In 2009 Groupon dominated overseas; in July 2009 Wang Xing’s Fanfo was shut down, leading him to create a Groupon‑like site.

Hundreds of group‑buying startups emerged, with the strongest being Lasho, Meituan, WoWoTuan, 24 Roll, ManzuoTuan, and Gaopeng.

In 2011 the "Thousand‑Group War" erupted, with advertising budgets soaring to 200 million RMB.

Wang Xing’s Meituan grew steadily while competitors burned cash.

Meituan secured $50 million from Alibaba’s Jack Ma, learned from past failures, and focused on operational efficiency.

By 2013 many group‑buying sites went bankrupt or were sold; only Meituan survived.

After 2010 the PC internet declined and mobile internet entered its golden age.

In 2014 the O2O battle began, driven by the proliferation of smartphones and the legacy of the group‑buying wars.

In 2011, Didi Kuaidi was founded by Cheng Wei, who received support from Tencent’s engineers to handle massive traffic.

The "taxi war" saw Didi and Kuaidi offering subsidies of 12–13 RMB per ride, leading to a cash‑burning frenzy.

Both companies survived while many smaller players collapsed.

Uber entered China, but after intense competition, Didi merged with Kuaidi and later acquired Uber’s Chinese operations.

In 2009 Zhang Xuhau, a student, conceived a bike‑sharing idea that later became ofo.

In 2014 Hu Weiwei, after failing to rent a bike in Hangzhou, co‑founded Mobike.

The bike‑sharing market attracted massive investment despite unclear business models, leading to free rides and promotional offers.

However, vandalism and theft surged, and many small players fell, leaving only ofo and Mobike.

Eventually, Mobike was acquired by Meituan, while ofo’s founders exited.

Harbor Bike, backed by Alibaba, later entered the market, marking the end of the bike‑sharing wars.

The article concludes that the past ten years were a period of intense competition driven by new technologies and markets, creating opportunities for entrepreneurs and workers, and that future breakthroughs in 5G, AI, IoT, industrial internet, and autonomous driving will spark new battles and prosperity.

The author, having participated in the 3Q war, looks forward to witnessing and joining future internet battles.