How I Traced a Gambling Site Operator Using OSINT Techniques

I received a message from a fan whose wife had lost over a million yuan on an online gambling site and asked me to help prevent the site from harming others.

Using the site's URL, I performed a Whois lookup on the domain registrar (GoDaddy) and found the registrant information hidden.

A ping test showed all nodes returned a single IP, indicating no CDN, and the server was identified as an Alibaba Cloud instance in Hong Kong.

Further IP-based searches revealed 237 other sites on the same server, all using the same template, suggesting a large‑scale operation.

I discovered a QQ number left as a customer service contact, added it, and began gathering information.

Through QQ's password‑recovery feature, I retrieved associated phone numbers (all starting with 188) and obtained an MD5‑hashed password, which I cracked to reveal a pattern linking the password to the user's ID.

Google searches uncovered the user's account on a hacking forum, where they posted another QQ number, confirming the identity.

Additional searches on the user's Tencent Weibo yielded an 18‑digit number matching an ID card format, which I inferred to be their national ID.

Using the QQ email, I accessed the user's Alipay account to verify their real name, then employed a public ID‑photo service to retrieve their identity document image.

By examining EXIF data from high‑resolution photos on a personal “leg‑photo” site linked to the operator, I extracted GPS coordinates and pinpointed their home address.

Armed with this comprehensive personal data, I contacted the operator, who initially denied involvement but eventually conceded after being presented with the evidence, returned the victim's money, and agreed to shut down the gambling sites.

Throughout the investigation, I employed WHOIS, ping, IP‑based site enumeration, QQ social‑engineering, MD5 cracking, forum research, and EXIF geolocation to trace the perpetrator.