Not All Flexible Work Is Equal: When Freedom Becomes a Risk

Flexibility Has Value, but Not All Flexibility Is the Same

In a recent interview, Zhang Dandan, deputy dean of the National Development Institute at Peking University, argued that from a labor‑economics perspective, flexibility itself is a form of welfare. Regular employees exchange time for five‑insurances‑and‑one‑fund benefits, while flexible workers gain self‑management and time autonomy at the cost of weaker social protection.

Critics point out that riders can log on freely but cannot choose not to earn; ride‑hailing drivers set their schedules yet bear vehicle depreciation, platform fees, and income volatility. Labeling such conditions as “welfare” merely repackages constraint as choice.

The interview later clarified that some workers actively choose flexibility, while others have "no choice" because stable contracts with full benefits are unavailable. The core issue becomes why the same "flexible" label is used for both groups despite their vastly different circumstances.

Different Types of Flexibility

For independent designers, online writers, or freelancers with multiple clients, time flexibility is a true professional advantage: they can select projects, set prices, and schedule work, turning flexibility into a non‑monetary gain.

Foreign field studies show that some workers are willing to sacrifice part of their wages for remote work or self‑scheduled hours, but preferences are highly heterogeneous. Extending the preferences of a minority to the entire gig population creates a problem.

"Flexible employment" covers a broad spectrum—from autonomous freelancers to ride‑hailing drivers, delivery couriers, day‑labourers, and factory gig workers. The former may voluntarily balance stability and freedom; the latter often choose between "temporary work available" and "no income at all."

Choosing Does Not Equal Liking

Economic theory infers preferences from observed choices only when all alternatives are simultaneously available. If a person can obtain a decent salaried job with full benefits and also take delivery gigs, choosing the gig suggests a preference for time freedom. However, if the same person submits dozens of applications without securing stable work and resorts to platform orders, the choice does not reveal a genuine preference for flexibility.

Thus, the claim that "flexible work is a welfare" overlooks the logical gap of assuming observed choices reflect original preferences without examining the choice set formation.

Effective Freedom Depends on the Cost of Refusal

A job’s total value can be expressed as:

Income + Autonomy + Security + Risk + Cost

where income is actual earnings, autonomy reflects control over time and work mode, security covers social insurance and stability, risk includes income volatility, injury, and unemployment, and cost accounts for commuting, equipment depreciation, and job‑switching expenses.

This model adds a layer beyond "salary plus freedom": the benefits of flexibility must be offset by the risks and costs incurred to obtain that flexibility.

For skilled workers with savings and multiple clients, refusing an order carries little cost, so the net gain can be high. For couriers who rely on daily orders to pay rent, not logging on means no income; the hidden cost of "not working" forces continuous labor, limiting real freedom.

Effective freedom can be defined as the number of feasible options a worker can reject multiplied by their capacity to bear the consequences of rejection. If a worker can technically go offline but then cannot meet rent, medical, or family expenses, their refusal power approaches zero, and effective freedom is minimal.

This reasoning explains why the UK Supreme Court, in the Uber driver case, looked beyond the ability to log off and examined who set prices, who controlled contracts, whether rejecting orders affected future dispatches, and whether ratings could restrict accounts. The court concluded that once the driver opens the app, the labor process is substantively controlled by the platform.

The Other Side of Flexibility: Risk Transfer

Platform economies create many entry points for work, lowering barriers to registration and training. From a business perspective, flexible labor turns fixed costs into variable costs: traditional firms must pay wages, social insurance, and idle‑staff costs even when orders are low, whereas platforms can scale labor up or down with demand.

Consequently, platforms gain demand‑responsive flexibility while workers bear waiting time, income volatility, vehicle depreciation, and occupational injury risks. Flexibility thus reduces operating costs for platforms but can make workers' income unpredictable.

Key Questions

Who receives the benefits of flexibility, and who bears its risks?

If platforms retain pricing, dispatch, and penalty authority while shifting market volatility, pension, medical, and injury risks entirely onto workers, the arrangement is not a simple "freedom‑for‑benefits" trade‑off but a transfer of risk from enterprises to individuals.

Why the "welfare" Label Sparks Anger

The controversy began with a mismatch of answers: the host asked about social security, yet the response emphasized flexibility, akin to answering a roof‑leak question by praising ventilation. The second sentence may not be false, but it sidesteps the core issue.

Moreover, "welfare" in economics denotes any utility‑enhancing factor, while everyday usage equates welfare with care and protection beyond income. When unstable, uninsured workers hear their situation called "welfare," they perceive a rebranding of hardship.

Zhang’s prior research has long focused on gig workers' hours, earnings, and social protection. Her surveys show that over half of riders desire pension insurance, and housing, medical, and children’s education are also major concerns. In a 2026 interview, she noted that about 20 % of riders complete roughly 80 % of orders, with some working over ten hours daily.

True Welfare Requires Protection After Flexibility

China has more than 200 million flexible workers, including about 84 million in new‑employment forms. Forecasts of 320 million by 2026 are based on institutional projections, not official statistics, but the scale already forces a structural shift in social‑security design.

The current social‑security system is built around stable employment relationships—one employer per worker. Gig workers often serve multiple platforms, making the "one‑person‑one‑employer" model inadequate.

Solutions should not eliminate flexibility nor force all workers into identical labor contracts. Instead, pension, medical, and occupational injury coverage should be portable across platforms, regions, and occupations, while platform control levels and revenue sources determine corporate responsibility.

Since 2025, occupational injury insurance pilots have enrolled 25.1 million participants, and policies now require platforms to disclose order allocation, piece‑rate pricing, commission ratios, and reward‑penalty algorithms. These measures acknowledge that flexible work is permissible, but basic risks cannot be fully shifted to individuals.

Flexibility can become genuine welfare only when workers have viable alternative options, can absorb the cost of rejecting orders, platforms cannot hide behind algorithms to evade responsibility, and social protection does not disappear because work forms change.

Without protection, flexibility may merely personalize risk; with protection, it can become true freedom.