Who Wins and Who Loses in the 2026 Strait Conflict? A Net Strategic Gain Index Ranking

Background

On 28 February 2026 the United States and Israel launched a joint military operation against Iran in the Strait of Hormuz. By 22 March the conflict had lasted 24 days, with reported U.S. casualties, Iranian counter‑attacks and a naval blockade that disrupted global oil flows.

Net Strategic Gain Index (NSGI)

NSGI is a static, cross‑sectional model that converts qualitative observations into quantitative scores for each of seven dimensions. The index ranges from –1 (pure loss) to +1 (pure gain). Scores are normalised separately for benefits and costs, then combined.

Benefit dimensions (equal weight)

Economic gain – changes in energy prices, trade opportunities, sanction relief.

Geopolitical gain – expanded strategic space, pressure on rivals, increased bargaining power.

Soft‑power gain – improved international image, internal cohesion, diplomatic initiative.

Opportunity gain – windows created by opponents’ attention shifts.

Cost dimensions (equal weight)

Direct military cost – casualties, equipment loss, resource consumption.

Economic cost – higher energy import bills, supply‑chain disruptions, currency depreciation.

Political cost – domestic opposition, reputational damage, diplomatic isolation.

Each dimension is scored on a 0–1 scale based on publicly available reports; the four benefit scores are averaged, the three cost scores are averaged, and the final NSGI is calculated as:

NSGI = (average benefit score) – (average cost score)

All scores involve subjective judgement and reflect the situation on day 24 of the war.

Key Findings – Ranking of 21 Entities

Top net beneficiaries (positive NSGI):

Russia – +0.793 (energy revenue surge, reduced strategic pressure)

China – +0.639 (diplomatic initiative, stable energy channels)

India – +0.298 (cheap Russian oil, strategic diplomatic dividends)

Turkey – +0.246 (mediation value, hub‑status premium)

Kazakhstan / Central Asia – +0.243 (transit earnings, trade‑route benefits)

Venezuela – +0.239 (higher oil prices, reduced U.S. focus)

Ukraine – +0.146 (slight net gain from reduced U.S. pressure to end the war)

Pakistan – +0.021 (energy‑corridor gains offset costs)

Net losers** (negative NSGI):

Lebanon – –0.558

Yemen – –0.496

United States – –0.492

Saudi/Gulf states – –0.454

Israel – –0.421

Iran – –0.367

United Kingdom – –0.329

Japan – –0.318

South Korea – –0.253

European Union – –0.158

Qatar – –0.109

Egypt – –0.050

Interpretation

The highest scores belong to “functional observers” that do not fight directly but own energy‑export assets; the war‑induced spike in oil prices creates a strong externality that rewards exporters (e.g., Russia, Kazakhstan, Venezuela) and penalises import‑dependent economies (e.g., Japan, South Korea, EU). Political and military costs are concentrated on the direct combatants, driving their negative scores.

Limitations

NSGI is a snapshot based on day‑24 data; scores are subjective and do not capture dynamic trends, humanitarian costs, or long‑term reconstruction expenses. Future cease‑fire timing, global recession risk, or a reversal in oil prices could substantially alter the rankings, especially for the United States, Iran and Gulf states whose scores are highly sensitive to oil‑price movements.

Further Questions

Why do non‑combatant observers generally achieve higher gains than expected?

Is Russia’s benefit chain vulnerable to a rapid oil‑price decline?

How does Qatar’s dual position—high LNG revenue but elevated political risk—affect its net score?

What structural factors cause Japan and South Korea to incur severe losses?

Why are Lebanon and Yemen the deepest losers despite not being primary combatants?

What hidden costs do Gulf oil‑producing states face beyond immediate fiscal gains?