Why Ukraine's Rival Intelligence Agencies Turned Guns on Each Other: Institutional Incentives Over National Security

Incident Overview

On September 2, 2024, personnel from Ukraine's Security Service (SBU) and the Main Directorate of Intelligence (HUR) engaged in an armed standoff outside a residential building in Kyiv. SBU's "Alpha" special forces and HUR's special operations units blocked roads, detained individuals, and exchanged gunfire after hours of confrontation. Three HUR personnel were wounded, one seriously. President Zelensky condemned the event as "absolutely shameful" and ordered investigations, emphasizing that Ukrainian guns should only target Russian forces.

The Central Figure: Stepan Kaplunov

The conflict centered on Stepan Kaplunov, a Russian-born fighter who joined the Ukrainian side after 2014 and serves as deputy commander of the "Russian Volunteer Corps" under HUR's "Tymur" special forces. On August 23, plainclothes agents detained Kaplunov near his home; his whereabouts remained unknown for nine days. Kaplunov later claimed he was secretly held by SBU and coerced into admitting contact with Russia's FSB. SBU asserted they found evidence of Kaplunov's involvement in a Russian-planned assassination and communications with Russian operatives. On September 1, SBU brought Kaplunov to his residence for a search; HUR personnel intercepted the SBU vehicles, leading to the shootout.

Competing Narratives and Institutional Overlap

SBU framed the operation as routine counterintelligence; HUR called it an illegal kidnapping of its own operative. The article notes that while SBU is tasked with domestic security, counterintelligence, and counterterrorism, and HUR handles military intelligence, overseas reconnaissance, and behind-enemy-lines operations, the war has blurred these boundaries. SBU now conducts drone strikes, sabotage, and cross-border covert ops; HUR manages special forces and Russian anti-government armed groups on Ukrainian soil.

Mixed-Motive Model of Institutional Behavior

The author proposes a mixed-motive model: each agency maximizes a utility function combining national security (S), organizational budget/authority/prestige (O), leadership and personnel career interests (P), and the costs of conflict, casualties, illegality, and accountability (C). Public statements emphasize S, but actions are driven by O and P as well. For SBU, the decision to act depends on the probability Kaplunov is a Russian agent (p), the potential national loss if a spy is released (L_s), the loss from wrongfully detaining a loyal asset (L_e), organizational gain from a successful case (G_o), personal gain for involved officers (G_p), potential penalties for illegality (P_n), and the probability of actual accountability (q). War amplifies L_s, making preemptive detention more attractive, but G_o and G_p also push toward action — exposing a rival's penetration expands one's own authority, while refusing to admit error protects leadership positions.

HUR faces a similar calculus: protecting Kaplunov avoids losing a key operative and preserves unit morale and institutional credibility. Even if armed intervention raises national-level conflict risks, the benefits accrue to HUR while costs are borne by the state, making hardline action rational from the organization's perspective.

Secrecy Undermines Accountability

The article highlights that the critical variable is not the penalty magnitude but the probability of accountability (q). Intelligence work is inherently secret; agencies can withhold evidence citing national security, attribute failures to source changes, enemy deception, or tactical errors. External oversight struggles to distinguish genuine national protection from departmental self-protection. When q is low, expected costs remain small even if potential damages are huge. In this case, key questions — why Kaplunov was held secretly for nine days, who authorized the operation, his legal status, why HUR could deploy forces to block SBU — remain unanswered.

The Danger of Equating Organizational Interest with National Interest

Organizational self-interest need not involve corruption or foreign allegiance. Protecting reputation, refusing to admit mistakes, safeguarding leadership authority, and shielding one's own personnel are all legitimate-seeming organizational interests because loyalty, honor, and secrecy are intrinsic to intelligence work. The problem arises when departmental loyalty supersedes adherence to shared rules: "protecting our own" becomes obstruction of investigations, and "defending national security" becomes expansion of departmental power.

A mature security system must not assume intelligence agencies lack self-interest; it must acknowledge their inevitable interests and constrain them through clear mandates, independent judicial review, and real accountability. If the investigation merely removes a few individuals without clarifying responsibility for secret detention and armed confrontation, both sides will conclude that procedures are unreliable and only their own force matters. The gravest risk for a nation is not an agency openly pursuing its interests, but one that genuinely believes: the agency's interest is the national interest . Reality may differ.