In Android, Bundles backed by memory‑efficient ArrayMap use binary search and shrinkable storage, making them far smaller and faster to transmit than HashMaps, whose fixed‑size growth and lack of shrinkage consume more memory; thus Parcelable Bundles are preferred for IPC, while Serializable remains suited only for persistent storage.
This article examines how mismatched read/write implementations in Android's Parcelable and AIDL mechanisms create exploitable IPC vulnerabilities, outlines several historical bug patterns, and discusses potential attack vectors and mitigation strategies.
This article analyzes a class of historical Android Parcelable vulnerabilities, explains the LazyValue mechanism and its use‑after‑recycled issue, demonstrates how negative length fields can rewind parcel pointers, and outlines exploitation steps and patch locations.
This article examines how inconsistencies between Parcelable serialization and deserialization in Android's Binder/Parcel mechanism can cause data misalignment, enabling attackers to craft malicious Bundles that bypass checks, and outlines various exploitation scenarios and mitigation strategies introduced in recent Android releases.
